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I. GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Relevance of the research. Interpretation of the economy as a set of 
transactions, where participants enter into contractual relations concerning various 
assets in order to implement their inherent targets, inevitably leads to the recognition 
of the objectivity of the prerequisites of opportunistic behavior as a form of 
implementation of the interaction of economic agents. 
Sources of opportunism occur at all stages of development of human 
civilization, regardless of the dominant type of economic structure and the nature of 
government. This is reflected in economic science, which is independent of the initial 
principles of the study of the world, recognize the existence of different forms of 
opportunistic behavior and offer tools to prevent and (or) prevention of its 
consequences for society as a whole or for individual subjects. 
Differences in approaches to the interpretation of opportunism, which due to 
the peculiarities of methodological platforms studies and are expressed in the 
conceptual framework, analytical tools, content, methodological approaches and 
practical guidelines, do not prevent the recognition of the thesis on the revitalization 
of opportunistic behavior in modern society and the enlargement of its subjects. This 
provision is of particular importance for the Russian economy, structural 
transformation which led to the formation of a qualitatively new institutional 
environment and the formation of target participants under the influence of the laws 
of the market economy. Thus were created the conditions for opportunistic behavior 
at the micro, meso and macro levels of the economic system, which is characterized 
by the presence of general and specific properties. 
The basic assumption of the neoclassical theory ("mainstream"), which consists 
in the recognition of excellence information and absolute rationality of choice of 
economic agents, does not allow substantiating the origin of opportunism and 
formulating tools aimed at its prevention. This raises the need to address the 
institutional framework, which treats the opportunism as a result of the breach of 
contract due to information imperfections and inefficiencies of the institutional 
environment, which entails high transaction costs of overcoming, adverse selection 
and the decline of social welfare. Such approach allows explaining the reasons for the 
wide spread of opportunism in the modern Russian economy, in which there are 
numerous institutional voids and institutional traps, ineffective mechanism for 
enforcement of contracts and unwillingness of economic agents to comply with 
existing norms of behavior. The complexity of measuring the volume of losses from 
opportunistic behavior of economic agents tied to what is most obvious to them the 
direct consequences of the implementation of the selection from a set of alternatives 
affect the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators indirectly, as reflected in the level 
of public welfare. For example, according to the National Bureau of credit histories 
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(NBCH), if as of 01.01.2013, the number of overdue Bank loans in the Russian 
Federation amounted to about 577 thousand, what caused the loss of banks, estimated 
at 67 billion (as of 01.01.2014, the number has doubled and amounted to 1.2 million, 
and the amount of losses suffered by the banks amounted to 153 billion rubles thus, 
the opportunistic behavior of borrowers caused direct empirical losses of credit 
institutions, which inevitably affects the dynamics of key aggregate indicators of the 
state of the Russian economy.  
Treatment of opportunistic behavior as a violation of obligations under the 
contractual relationship with contractors for the purpose of obtaining additional 
benefits from the fulfillment/non-fulfillment of contract conditions and the resulting 
reduction in benefits contractor does not mean that any breach of contract terms can 
be considered as manifestations of opportunism, since the latter is associated with the 
reallocation of assets and income. The redistribution of income resulting from 
opportunistic behavior entails a reduction in social welfare, due to the rising costs of 
elimination of the damage actually caused and implementation of preventive 
measures aimed at neutralizing the risks of economic agents. 
The emergence of new forms of opportunism of economic agents of change, 
technological structure, economic configuration space transactions and regulatory 
institutions necessitates studying the impact of opportunistic behavior on the 
dynamics of indicators of the Russian economy on the basis of the collection and 
processing of empirical data, development, adapted to the peculiarities of the national 
economy tools for preventing and overcoming the consequences. This determined the 
choice of the dissertation, its theoretical and practical significance. 
Previous studies.  The analysis of numerous publications devoted to the 
problems of opportunistic behavior shows that the issues associated with its 
manifestations are the center of attention of representatives of various economic 
schools. 
Beginning the study of opportunistic behavior of economic agents was initiated 
in the works of representatives of the classical school of political economy, which is 
considered a separate form of its manifestation (P. Smith, J. B. Sy, W. Petty, D. 
Ricardo, etc.). 
In the second half of the XX century in the framework of institutional theory 
O. Williamson introduced the modern definition of opportunistic behavior. 
Institutional approach to the study of opportunistic behavior is implemented in the 
works of foreign (A. Alchian, J. Buchanan, T. Veblen, J. K. Galbraith, D. R. Comons, 
S. Cornell, R. Coase, W. Mitchell, D. North, and others) and russian authors (A. A. 
Auzan, O. S. belokrylova, O. E. Bessonova, R. I. Kapelyushnikov, G. B. Kleiner, R. 
M. Nureev, A. N. Oleinik, V. M. Polterovich, A. E. Shastitko, etc.). 
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The results of a study of the impact of opportunism on the level of public 
welfare represented in the works of M. Allais, G. Becker and J. Tallok, the 
relationship of opportunism and adverse selection – in the writings of J. Akerlof ' s 
tools management software deals in models of signals and filtering – in the writings 
of G. Spence, J. Stiglitz and others Opportunistic behavior in correlation with the 
dynamics of transaction costs is studied in the works of P. Milgrom, R. Richter, G. 
Simon, E. Furubotn, B. Holmstrom, T. Eggertsson, etc. 
In Russian economic thought certain aspects of opportunistic behavior is 
investigated in the works of I. A. Baev, A. V. Bass, N. Yu. Bogdanova, O. G. 
Bodrov, A. O. Verenikin, V. V. Volchik, A. A. Zatsepin, V. A. Isakov, B. O. Klimov, 
A. I. Korolev, R. M. Kundakchan, A. Makarov, E. G. Marchukova, V. V. Melnikov, 
V. A. Lamanova, E. V. Popov, T. A. Slideway, A. J. Shults, K. E. Troshina, etc. 
Significant contribution to the study of the behavior of economic agents introduced 
by D. Kahneman, A. Levinson, V. Smith, A. Shleifer, and etc. 
The manifestation of opportunistic behavior among economic agents linked to 
the level of development of the institution of trust in the economic system. Economic 
understanding of the essence and nature of trust as an institution originated in the 
works of J. Coleman, K. Arrow, F. Fukuyama and others Among russian economists 
who contributed to the study of trust relationships should be allocated to A. 
Vartanyan, V. E. Dementieva, Y. G. Efimova, A. K. Lascaux, A.V. Polyakov, Yu. 
Ya. Alesevich, V. V. Shaposhnikova, etc. 
The integration of economic agents within the network entities as a factor in 
the prevention of opportunistic behavior is studied in the works of F. Peru, M. Porter, 
and others. This research direction opportunism is reflected in the works of russian 
autors - V. A. Agafonov, R. E. Akhmetzyanova, N. G. Bagautdinova, V. O. 
Berdichevskaya, Y. V. Zhiltsova, A. A. Ivanenko, E. V. Korkodinova, L. S. Markov, 
A. I. Noskov-Dukelsky, O. V. Osipova, M. R. Safiullin, and others. 
Despite a considerable amount of work devoted to the sources of opportunistic 
behavior of economic agents, forms of implementation, the mechanism of effects on 
social welfare are a number of aspects of this problem have not been reflected in the 
scientific literature that causes the lack of effective mechanisms to prevent the 
consequences of opportunism, taking into account the peculiarities of modern 
Russian economy. This defined purpose, objectives and structure of the dissertation 
research. 
Aim and objectives of the research. The aim of the dissertation is a scientific 
justification of the theoretical and methodological approach to the essence and forms 
of opportunistic behavior, and in developing on the basis of the findings, practical 
recommendations regarding the content of the tools to prevent opportunism, taking 
into account its influence on the development of the modern Russian economy. 
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The implementation of the objectives of the study determined the formulation 
and solution of the following main objectives: 
1. To present the interpretation of opportunistic behavior of economic agents 
based on epistemological potential of alternative schools and trends, to propose a 
typology of forms of opportunism given the level of specificity of assets. 
2. To analyze the dependence of the interest rate and the loan volume from the 
volume of the costs of opportunistic behavior. 
3. To highlight types of opportunistic behavior of economic agents, 
distinguished by the contents of a mechanism for enforcement of the contract with 
their participation. 
4. To study the dependence of the results of opportunistic behavior from the 
direction and pace of the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators. 
5. To reveal the contents of the "institutional trap of opportunism" and its 
influence on the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators. 
6. To analyze the role of integrated formations (clusters) in overcoming the 
consequences (prevention) opportunistic behavior of economic agents. 
The object of research is the opportunistic behavior of agents of the Russian 
economy. 
The subject of research is the mechanism of the effect of opportunistic 
behavior on the indicators of development of modern Russian economy. 
Theoretical and methodological basis of the dissertation research are the 
provisions of alternative schools of economic theory, including the theory of 
behavioral economics, property rights theory, contract theory, theory of institutions 
and institutional change, theory of transaction costs, theory of the welfare state. The 
conclusions and recommendations obtained in the course of the study, formulated in 
accordance with the general methodological principles of dialectics, and with a 
systematic approach to the analysis of economic processes and phenomena. During 
the scientific research used scientific methods to study economic phenomena and 
processes, as well as observation, interviews, methods of socio-economic forecasting 
and programming (methods of correlation and regression analysis, etc.), as well as 
quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the quality of econometric models, etc. 
Information base of the research consists of authorities of the Federal 
service of state statistics of the Russian Federation (RF) and their territorial bodies, 
official statistical agencies of foreign countries, the Ministry of economic 
development of the Russian Federation, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 
Association of Russian banks, the Ministry of economy of the Republic of Tatarstan 
(RT), reviews the practice of arbitration courts of the Russian Federation, 
proceedings of the international and domestic NGOs, specialized analysis of Russian 
and foreign companies. 
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Regulatory framework studies are legislative acts and regulatory documents 
that define the principles and tools of regulation of socio-economic relations in the 
Russian Federation (the Strategy of socio-economic development of Tatarstan till 
2030, etc.), individual sectors of economic activity – investment-construction 
complex, banks, shopping areas treatment, etc. 
In the process of preparation of work as an information sources were used 
monographs, collective works, publications in peer-reviewed federal research 
journals, periodicals, materials of scientific conferences, official websites of domestic 
and foreign statistical agencies, and other information resources of the global 
network, the Internet, etc. 
The content of the research corresponds to claim 1. General economic theory: 
1.1. Political economy: the structure and regularities of development of economic 
relations; the impact of new technological structures on the processes of formation 
and functioning of economic structures and institutions; 1.2. Microeconomic theory: 
interdependence of public and personal wealth; 1.4. Institutional and evolutionary 
economic theory: the theory of property rights; the theory of transaction costs; 
institutional theory of the firm; an evolutionary theory of economic dynamics; 
development of the institutions of the economic mechanism in the post-industrial 
society of the passport of the Russian VAK specialty 08.00.01 – Economic theory. 
Scientific novelty of the research lies in the scientific substantiation of 
theoretical and methodological approaches to the essence and forms of opportunistic 
behavior, and in developing on the basis of the findings, practical recommendations 
regarding the content of the tools to prevent opportunism, taking into account its 
influence on the development of the modern Russian economy that is specified in the 
following provisions: 
1. The proposed typology of forms of opportunistic behavior of economic 
agents, using as a classification criterion the level of specificity of the assets that 
allowed us to identify opportunism in the framework of implementation of formal 
and informal contractual relations concerning nonspecific, male specific and 
idiosyncratic assets, the implementation of which ensures the maximization of the 
utility of individual counterparty based on its redistribution in the presence of 
available counterparties of information, generation of unproductive (explicit and 
implicit) costs, reducing the efficiency of the allocation of resources and public 
welfare. 
2. Identified a direct correlation interest rates and an inverse relationship with 
the volume of Bank loans from the number of bad debtors (collective and individual 
entrepreneurs) that implement the model of opportunistic behavior, which confirmed 
the hypothesis about the negative impact of the costs of opportunistic behavior on the 
dynamics of the main macroeconomic indicators. 
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3. Types of opportunistic behavior of economic agents were selected, 
distinguished by the contents of a mechanism for enforcement of the contract with 
their participation, namely: simple opportunism of agents of contractual relations, 
characterized by a certain level of development of trust as a form of risk and using 
shmainforest or impersonal enforcement, which leads to an increase post-contractual 
(expost) transaction costs; complicated opportunism of agents of contractual 
relations, using the enforcement involving formal or informal agents guarantor that 
leads to an increase in pre-contract (ex ante) transaction costs; 
4. Statistically significant dependence of the results of opportunistic behavior 
on the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators and proved that in a period of 
deteriorating macroeconomic situation the costs of opportunism are growing, because 
the decrease in total income and profit rate stimulates economic agents to use the 
tools of formal and informal enforcement of contracts, whereas in the context of 
rising macroeconomic indicators of the costs of enforcement exceed the benefits from 
the implementation of contractual relations involving prone to opportunism of 
economic agents. 
5. Defined the content of the "institutional trap of opportunism", which is 
treated as a set of sustainable inefficient institutions that ensure the reproduction of 
opportunistic behavior of economic agents and preventing the effective reallocate 
assets, which allows, on the one hand, to treat the costs of opportunism as an 
alternative to costly incentives and control, on the other hand, to consider 
opportunism as a factor of learning, adaptation, and the formation of institutions and 
organizations that reduce the level of uncertainty of the external environment and 
acting as additional restrictions for selecting, from the set of alternatives. 
6. It is proved that in the conditions of network economy, the formation of 
integrated structures (clusters) with the participation of state bodies, commercial and 
non-profit organizations is a factor of the formation of personal and non-personal 
trust relationships (trust expectations, trust in competence, trust in contact); it is 
determined that the clustering of economic space increases the level of completeness 
of the contract and contributes to the development of effective tools for signaling, 
reducing exogenous transaction costs of opportunism economic agents; the findings 
confirmed the author's calculations (on the example of functioning of the construction 
cluster RT). 
Theoretical and practical significance of the research lies in the further 
development of the theory of transaction costs based on the identified features of the 
existence of opportunistic behavior on individual sectorial markets. 
Recommendations regarding the use of clustering mechanisms of the economy as a 
tool to reduce costs of opportunistic behavior can be used when developing strategies 
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for socio-economic development of the national economy as a whole and its 
constituent regional entities. 
The thesis materials can be used in educational process of universities 
specializing in the field of training and retraining of highly qualified personnel for 
enterprises, public authorities and local governments in reading courses on 
«Economic theory», «Institutional Economics». 
Approbation of the research results. The main provisions and conclusions of 
the thesis are outlined, discussed and approved at international, national, regional 
scientific-practical and scientific-methodical conferences in 2012-2015: international 
scientific-practical conference "Problems of modernization and post-crisis 
development of modern society" (Saratov, 2012), regional student scientific and 
practical conference within the framework of realization "Program of development of 
the activities of student associations of the University" (Kazan, 2012), the 
international youth scientific conference "Generation the future: a View of young 
scientists" (Kursk, 2013), international economic Symposium dedicated to the 50th 
anniversary of economic faculty of the Tomsk state University (Tomsk, 2013), all-
Russian scientific-practical conference of students and postgraduates "Kazan 
scientific conference of students and postgraduates – 2013" (Kazan, 2013), II 
regional youth Symposium "Scientific youth – Volga Federal district" (Kazan, 2013), 
the IV all-Russian scientific-practical conference "anti-corruption Dialectics" (Kazan, 
2014), XX international scientific and practical conference "Modern approaches to 
the formation of the concept of economic growth: theory and practice" (St. 
Petersburg, 2014), III international youth scientific conference "The Future of science 
– 2015" (Kursk, 2015) and others. 
 On the topic of the dissertation published 14 scientific publications volume 
6,275 l. p. (aut. – the 5.2 l. p.), including 4 articles in journals "Actual problems of 
Economics and law", "In the world of scientific discoveries", " Modern research of 
social problems" included in the list recommended by the Higher Attestation 
Commission of Russia publications for the publication of materials on candidate and 
doctoral dissertations. 
Theoretical and practical recommendations have been implemented and used in 
the educational process Kazan (Volga region) Federal University, Ministry of 
economy of the Republic of Tatarstan, which is confirmed by certificates of 
introduction. 
The structure of the research identified on the basis of the purpose and 
objectives of the dissertation research. The work includes an introduction, two 
chapters, which contain 6 sections, conclusion, list of references and tabular and 
graphic material. 
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In the introduction relevance of the research topic, reveals the extent of the 
problem in domestic and foreign literature, defines the purpose and objectives, 
subject and object, methodological and theoretical foundations, scientific novelty and 
practical significance of the presented testing results of the study and its structure. 
In the first chapter "Theoretical and methodological bases of research of 
opportunistic behavior of economic agents" presents an analysis of alternative 
approaches to the content of the categories of "opportunism" and "opportunistic 
behavior", formulated the main approaches to the study of the content and forms of 
opportunistic behavior, the correlation between opportunistic behavior and the 
dynamics of development of the Russian economy. 
In the second chapter "Analysis of the mechanism of the impact of 
opportunistic behavior on the dynamics of the main indicators of the state of the 
Russian economy" contains a study of the manifestations of opportunistic relations in 
the branch markets, the models, reflecting the impact of the costs of opportunistic 
behavior on the main macroeconomic indicators, articulated forms and methods of 
institutional design of opportunistic behavior of economic agents. 
In conclusion the main conclusions and results of the thesis. 
 
II. MAIN SCIENTIFIC RESULTS 
1. The proposed typology of forms of opportunistic behavior of economic 
agents, using as a classification criterion the degree of specificity of assets. 
Opportunistic behavior is defined as an evasion of the subject of the contractual 
relationship from the performance of obligations to the counterparty not provided by 
the mechanism of formal or informal enforcement of the contract. In accordance with 
the principles of institutional concepts, contracts in civil law are treated as contracts, 
regulated by formal institutions and those which are obvious. The contract as an 
orderly institutions, the transaction will not tolerate unilateral refusal of execution of 
the obligation and unilateral change of its conditions, except for the cases stipulated 
by normative legal acts, or contract. Among the variety of institutions that regulate 
contractual relations in civil law, some General and specific rules and regulations, in 
accordance with which it is possible to identify General and specific characteristics of 
the contracts, and to submit the appropriate classification and to characterize the 
socio-economic impacts during the implementation of each type of contract. 
Consequently, the existence of opportunistic behavior varies depending on the type of 
contract (contractual relations in civil law), enforcement mechanism and types of 
obligations that arise under the contracts. 
The study analyzes the characteristics of the transactions in the two types of 
civil contracts: construction contract and loan agreements. The choice of the contract 
the study of opportunistic behavior due to their mass use, there was a considerable 
11 
 
amount of information in this field facts, information asymmetry between the 
customer and the contractor (the performer of construction works), which is evidence 
of the existence of opportunistic behavior by all parties to contracts. During the 
implementation of construction contracts there is a lot of conflict situations, which 
subsequently resolved in pre-trial (retentiona) or court order. Taking into account the 
probability of such events, counterparties of contractual relations seek to compensate 
the risk of failure of the transaction to the overestimation of the yield. 
The choice as a subject of research contracts lending due to their mass 
distribution, the development of the market of banking services, the products of 
which have common features: interest rate, term of loans, repayment schedule, etc. 
The availability of standardized assets in respect of which the leases are, makes the 
possibility of standardization ex-contractual and post-contractual procedures. 
As a result of the study, it was found that forms of opportunistic behavior differ 
depending on the level of specificity of assets. The study of the manifestations of 
opportunism in the framework of implementation of formal and informal contractual 
relations concerning nonspecific, low specific and idiosyncratic assets showed that 
the higher the level of specificity of the assets that are the subject of the contract, the 
higher the risk of opportunistic behavior. Thereby, it is possible to complement the 
existing institutional framework of the concept of a list of classification signs of 
opportunistic behavior based on the level of asset specificity, which allows us to 
distinguish opportunism of participants of contracts in respect of standardized 
products (non-specific assets) and the opportunism of participants of contracts in 
respect of non-standardized products (when the object of the contract are low specific 
or idiosyncratic assets). Among the first in the work of the related credit agreements, 
among the second – the construction contracts. 
2. Identified a direct correlation of the interest rate and inverse 
dependence of the volume of Bank loans and the number of borrowers that 
implement the model of opportunistic behavior, which confirmed the hypothesis 
about the negative impact of the costs of opportunistic behavior on the dynamics 
of the main macroeconomic indicators.  
The implementation of the economic agents of opportunistic actions leads to 
the emergence of transaction costs resulting from opportunistic behavior. Direct 
impact of opportunistic behavior of economic agents on the dynamics of transaction 
costs is not sufficiently studied. It is possible to separate the costs of opportunism on: 
first, the costs of restoration of violated rights as a result of implementing the 
counterparty opportunistic actions in violation of long-standing commitments 
(reimbursement of actual damage), and secondly, the costs of preventive protection 
from opportunistic counterparty (costs of prevention of potential damage from 
misconduct of the partner). 
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The study presents a methodological approach to estimating the volume and 
dynamics of transaction costs of opportunistic behavior on the basis of the analysis 
procedure for determination of Bank interest rates on loan products. Interest rates 
depend on the amount of money in circulation, the demand for borrowed funds, the 
nature of measures of state regulation of the real and financial sectors of the 
economy, period of loan and rate of the national currency, the assessment by the 
lender of default risk of the loan, the last factor is determined by the need to 
implement preventive measures against opportunistic behavior of economic agents. 
In this case, unscrupulous borrower's behavior is a form of voluntary or 
involuntary opportunism, where a forced opportunism arises due to force majeure 
that prevent the repayment of the loan (the deterioration in macroeconomic 
conditions, resulting in a change to the conditions of conducting economic activity; 
changes in institutions, tax system, which determined the increase of the tax burden; 
aggravation of geopolitical risks, etc.). 
Due to the complexity of selection of quantitative variables for the analysis and 
evaluation of the costs of opportunistic behavior, the study made the assumption, 
according to which the credit institution lays in interest rates on loans the amount of 
potential loss from opportunistic behavior of the borrower. Probable loss is equal to 
the value of unpaid credit. At the macroeconomic level, the volume of overdue credit 
funds is defined as the sum of overdue debt on loans. The possibility of using this 
indicator to assess the costs of opportunistic behavior are limited, since the arrears, 
which show the banking organization, during the recession underestimates the data of 
its credit risk. In the absence of other statistical information about the characteristics 
of the overdue debt, the indicator may be considered when modeling the influence of 
costs of opportunistic behavior on some indicators of economic activity of the credit 
organizations of the sphere. 
Indicators average weighted interest rate on loans and the amount of arrears 
(which is regarded as one of the indicators of the costs of opportunistic behavior by 
counterparties credit agreements) correlated with each other on 72,36%, reflecting a 
statistically significant direct relationship between them and confirms the working 
hypothesis that with the increase in overdue debt on loans, ceteris paribus, interest 
rates will have a tendency to increase. 
As a dependent variable (Y) was selected indicator total loans to legal entities-
residents and individual entrepreneurs in rubles, the Russian Federation, mln rub. 
As explanatory variables (X1– X2): the real value of overdue debts of legal 
entities-residents and individual entrepreneurs, mln rub. RUB. (X1) and GDP, total 
for the Russian Federation, in million RUR (X2). Since the correlations between all 
the parameters of the model do not exceed 75%, we can assume that the problem of 
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multicollinearity is absent. Function multiple regression models built based on the 
above factors, can be represented by formula (1). 
У = - 45 836 510,58 – 42,6 * Х1 + 12,01 * Х2                                                 (1) 
The value of the random error for the indicator X1 is 17,78; with the increase of 
overdue debts of legal entities-residents and individual entrepreneurs at 1 million 
rubles, the volume of lending to these categories of borrowers will decrease by 42.6 
million rubles the Value of the random error for the indicator X2 is 2,69; when GDP 
increase by 1 million rubles, the volume of lending to these categories of borrowers 
will increase by 12,01 million rub. The coefficient of determination (R2=0,69) 
indicates the average predictive quality of the calculations. 
Thus, the introduction of the model factor, which indirectly characterizes the 
costs of opportunistic behavior showed its influence on the dynamics of the overall 
amount of lending to legal entities-residents. This confirms the hypothesis about the 
negative influence of costs of opportunistic behavior on the dynamics of 
macroeconomic indicators. 
3. Selected types of opportunistic behavior of economic agents, 
distinguished by the contents of a mechanism for enforcement of the contract 
with their participation.  
In the study, the analysis of formal rules governing the conclusion and 
execution of contracts (contracts for the implementation of construction works, a 
survey of professionals (quantity surveyors, planners, project managers, customer 
representative’s maintenance-mounted communication systems; employees of 
divisions of maintenance loan agreements banks, etc.) in the form of an interview to 
determine the forms of opportunistic behavior by counterparties. Verification of the 
research results, carried out on the basis of the analysis of judicial practice on 
disputes involving contracts, as well as judicial practice in disputes arising out of 
legal relationships governed by the provisions of the loan agreement. This allowed us 
to identify two forms of opportunistic behavior of participants of contractual 
relations: 
1. Opportunism in the form of abuse of trust of the other party contractual 
relationships. 
2. Opportunism in the form of collusion of one of the participants of 
contractual relations with other persons, which act as a sleeper agent. Collusion is to 
implement opportunistic actions and extract additional benefits. 
Breach of trust as a form of opportunistic behavior in the market at the 
conclusion of construction contracts represents the situation when the contractor or 
customer by providing incomplete or distorted information initiate additional costs of 
the counterparty (Fig. 1). The presence of a covert agent as a form of opportunistic 
behavior at the conclusion of contracts is a situation, when to implement 
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opportunistic actions of one of the parties to the transaction enters into a conspiracy 
with other persons who abuse their position for personal enrichment, resulting in the 
additional information asymmetry (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Breach of trust as a form of opportunistic behavior in the implementation of 
contracts 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The presence of a covert agent as a form of opportunistic behavior at the 
conclusion of contracts 
The contractor shall enter into an agreement with the customer's staff to 
overestimate the amount under the contract, in this case the employee of the 
customer, as a rule, also getting some of the benefits resulting from successful 
implementation of the transaction with the inclusion of opportunistic conditions. This 
scheme can take place in the relations between legal entities. In fact, an employee of 
the customer in this case acts as a hidden agent in the transaction, resulting in 
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asymmetry of information between: 1) the customer and the employee of the client; 
2) the employer and the contractor. 
Breach of trust as a form of opportunistic behavior in the market at the 
conclusion of the credit agreement is a situation where one of the parties to the 
transaction charge under the credit agreement or otherwise introduces additional costs 
to the other side of the transaction based on the conditions that are variously 
understood by the parties to the transaction and are the result of information 
asymmetry (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Scheme of breach of trust as a form of opportunistic behavior 
 
In cases where the creditor (credit institution) in the loan agreements prescribes 
the condition under which directs the borrower to obtain insurance (or other) in a 
certain firm, opportunistic behavior is implemented in accordance with the scheme in 
Fig. 4. In this case, the lender sends the borrower to insure the collateral in Bank 
accredited insurance company with which the creditor has an agreement on mutual 
cooperation (collusion), which implies for the borrower, as a rule, additional financial 
costs, and for the lender – receiving portion of the insurance premium as the gains 
from collusion. 
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Fig. 4. The scheme of realization of the transaction in the presence of a covert agent 
as a form of opportunistic behavior (for example the implementation of credit 
products) 
 
4. Statistically significant dependence of the results of opportunistic behavior on 
the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators and proved that in a period of 
deteriorating macroeconomic situation the costs of opportunism grow. 
One of the clearest examples of opportunistic behavior, which is confirmed by 
formal proofs, is economic crimes. Violation formalized the provisions of the Treaty 
entails the expenditure on the protection of the interests and, in particular, on trial. 
Consequently, these costs represent the costs of opportunistic behavior. In this case, a 
significant proportion of cases and the resolution of disputes in arbitration courts can 
be seen as a consequence of opportunistic behavior. These include the handling of 
cases and the resolution of disputes in arbitration courts in order to plunge the 
company in additional costs to obtain lost profits in the absence of the plaintiff 
grounds for a judicial decision in their favor. The possibility for appeal and further 
review of the case can be used more than once, which increases the time of the trial. 
Forms of implementation of opportunistic behavior are court proceedings that are 
initiated for the purpose of harming the reputation of the economic agent, and not 
with the purpose of protection of violated rights. 
The current trend to increase the number of cases processed annually and the 
amounts of the fees paid may indicate increased level of confidence in judicial 
institutions, and/or to increase the number of facts of opportunistic behavior and their 
scale. The increase in the number of cases leads to increased costs of economic 
agents for legal services that not only increases transaction costs in the economy, but 
at the same time allow you to attract unscrupulous contractor accountable and to 
restore justice. 
With the aim of finding dependencies of opportunistic behavior from economic 
growth have been analyzed, changes in the index of industrial production as an 
17 
 
indicator of economic growth, and the number of cases considered by arbitration 
courts of the Russian Federation for 2006-2013 Correlation between the index of 
industrial production index and the rate of growth in the number of cases by 
arbitration courts of subjects of the Russian Federation for the period was -0,7773. 
The inverse proportional relationship between the rate of economic growth and the 
rate of change in the number of cases by arbitration courts of Russia in 2006-2013, 
reflects the dependence of opportunistic behavior from economic growth. In a period 
of slowing economic growth, the costs of opportunistic behavior are growing on the 
background of the fact that the decrease of the total income and profit margins in the 
economy encourages economic agents to actively defend their economic interests, 
and often to engage in debate, which in larger amount of income could be resolved 
with a lesser degree of escalation of conflicts. 
5. Defined the content of the "institutional trap of opportunism", which is 
treated as a set of sustainable inefficient institutions that ensure the 
reproduction of opportunistic behavior of economic agents and preventing the 
effective reallocate assets. 
The objective prerequisites for opportunistic behavior of economic agents are 
the presence of uncertainty and the possibility of a conflict of interest contractors 
(that entails, including the information asymmetries); misuse of institutions 
(exploitation of information asymmetry, the manipulation of institutions, institutional 
traps). Of particular interest is the study of the relationship between the concepts of 
"opportunistic behavior" and "institutional trap". 
Institutional traps characterize the situation inefficient, but seemingly "easy" 
behaviors. The reliance of the socio-economic system from its previous path of 
development, and also in connection with the limited cognitive abilities of the person, 
the effects of these ineffective patterns of behavior could be very long. One of the 
most serious consequences "institutional traps" is that although they mitigate the 
negative short-term consequences of unprepared, too rapid transformation, at the 
same time they impede long-term economic growth. Phenomena such as barter, non-
payments, tax evasion and corruption, as a rule, refer to the examples of institutional 
traps in the Russian economy. On the economic content of these actions are 
opportunistic, as they involve a violation of formal or informal arrangements, and 
cause the redistribution of economic benefits between economic agents. 
Opportunistic behavior, on the one hand, represents the activity of the 
conservative, largely aimed at preserving the institutional status quo (in this sense, 
opportunism is a form of realization of the institutional balance, by D. North). On the 
other hand, opportunism could lead the economic system to static position only 
conditionally: management opportunism "makes" to evolve itself opportunism, which 
in turn determines the specific evolution of institutions. Just trying to get the 
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maximum benefit (from both sides of the transaction), while remaining within the 
boundaries of institutions, individuals for whom institutions act as constraints, can 
produce and reproduce them, to determine their ability, solving the problem of 
distribution of benefits from the transaction in terms of experimentation with 
different institutional forms of business rules. The possibility of opportunism become 
this approach does not dysfunctions of institutions, and one of the ways of their 
existence. With this perspective, opportunism is understood as a form of institutional 
forms. The "inside" of institutions opportunism should be understood as internal 
conflict requiring resolution. Opportunistic behavior is not an institution in itself. It 
can be realized in the interaction of economic agents within those institutions. The 
existence of opportunistic behavior are different and depend on the conditions of 
realization of each individual transaction (transactions), so that opportunistic 
behavior is not an institutional trap in the strict sense of the term. 
At the same time, creating conditions for the sustainable reproduction of the 
model of opportunistic behavior in the interaction of economic agents, can be 
attached in the form of "institutional traps" (e.g., corruption). To the rule of conduct 
was steady, individuals must be "unprofitable" or "impractical" to deviate from it. 
Over time, the resulting norm is coupled with many other rules embedded in the 
whole system socio-economic norms of interaction between economic agents. In this 
regard, the refusal to follow the norm will trigger a chain of other changes and, 
consequently, high transformation costs associated with the transition from one norm 
to another.  
Thus, when a particular type of economic structure are formed, the conditions 
for sustainable reproduction of opportunistic behavior is the formation of institutional 
traps. Thus, the analysis of the nature and forms of opportunistic behavior of 
economic agents has helped to clarify the concept of "institutional trap", interpreted 
as a set of conditions for the sustainable reproduction of opportunistic behavior, 
which reduces the efficiency of economic activity and is self-supporting in nature. 
6. It is proved that in the conditions of slavishly economy, the formation of 
integrated structures (clusters) with the participation of state bodies, 
commercial and non-profit organizations is a factor of the formation of personal 
and non-personal relationship of trust; it is determined that the clustering of 
economic space increases the level of completeness of the contract and 
contributes to the development of effective tools alarm systems that reduce 
transaction costs exogenous opportunism of economic agents. 
Conducted the research analysis showed that an increase in the frequency of 
interaction and the number of transactions between economic agents, the level of 
interpersonal trust in the relationship increases. Since the levels of trust and 
opportunistic behavior change mixed, with growth of number of transactions, the 
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level of opportunism will be reduced. A closer relationship between economic agents 
can be achieved through the creation of conditions for their further interaction, 
communication, exchange of information and experience. Spatial localization of 
related industries contributes to the increase in the number of linkages that will, in all 
likelihood, look for suppliers and customers mainly from the inner circle, and 
approximate areas that will allow them to reduce transport and other transaction costs 
of production and sales of their products. 
To test the hypothesis that the clusters by increasing the level of trust between 
its members in reducing costs of opportunistic behavior, the study examines the 
content of the cluster, studied theoretical models of cluster formations in the economy 
and methodological approaches to their study; identified the structure, sufficient and 
necessary signs of a cluster as an example of the construction cluster of the Republic 
of Tatarstan. In the structure of the construction cluster RT allocated to 7 groups of 
economic agents: 
I. Organization-builders. 
II. Manufacturers of construction materials. 
III. Project organizations and architectural offices. 
IV. The development organizations. 
V. Organizations conducting purchase/sale, rent of real estate. 
VI. Organizations engaged in the sale of construction materials, tools, interior 
and other product groups, indirectly related to the performance of enterprises in the 
construction industry. 
VII. The relevant Ministry performing regulatory functions in the construction 
industry. 
The study of mechanisms of functioning of cluster formations allowed us to 
formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence. Thus, the necessary 
conditions for the existence of the cluster are: elaboration of complex specialized 
business entities; geographical localization of their location, i.e. their concentrations; 
business and information communication between organizations in the cluster; the 
cluster must include a group of firms producing products for final consumption or for 
export. Sufficient conditions for the existence of the construction cluster are: specific 
legislation; the presence of bodies of state management in the sphere of construction, 
Supervisory authority; financial and credit institutions that provide specialized credit 
services organizations construction cluster; the presence of research institutes and 
educational institutions, providing technology development and training; a significant 
proportion of the production of enterprises cluster in gross regional product (GRP). 
Collected and analyzed empirical data about the level of trust in the context of 
globalization, the result of surveys of the global network of social studies "The World 
Values Survey". The results revealed with increasing frequency of interactions and 
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transactions between economic agents, the level of interpersonal trust will increase, 
that is, clustering economy is a factor of the formation of personal and impersonal 
trust. Since the levels of trust and opportunistic behavior change mixed, with growth 
in the number of transactions, the level of opportunism will be reduced. 
A closer relationship between economic agents can be achieved by creating 
conditions for their further interaction, exchange of information and experience. 
Spatial localization of complementary industries also contributes to an increase in the 
number of linkages, which will ceteris paribus to look for suppliers and clients 
mainly from the inner circle that will allow them to reduce transport and other 
transaction costs on production and sales of their products. 
Public associations, development institutions, interaction and collaboration, 
form production associations and cooperatives contribute to the reduction of losses 
from opportunistic behavior by reducing the risk of its occurrence due to the increase 
in the level of confidence. The formation of a favorable business climate between 
companies belonging to a cluster would make it unprofitable for each individual 
economic agent to deviate from the rules of conduct accepted in the group. Under the 
terms of the game theory, if players agree beforehand on the use of the strategies 
included in the equilibrium, individual deviation from the contract is disadvantageous 
to the player who deviated. Consequently, if economic agents are to cooperate in the 
framework of the institutions of interaction, including in the framework of the cluster, 
benefits from the implementation of opportunistic behavior in transactions between 
members of the cluster are reduced. The probability of detection and sanctions for 
opportunistic behavior increases. 
Thus, studies have shown that clustering is one of the ways to reduce 
transaction costs of opportunistic behavior in the economic system. 
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